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Abstract: 
 
This paper provides new evidence supporting the hypothesis that behavioral factors influence 
personal trade policy preferences in addition to the typical economic determinants.   It also 
examines the interaction of an uncertainty shock and behavioral factors on policy preferences.  
Using the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model as a theoretical framework, we apply ordered probit 
estimations to survey responses from an ISSP survey question about preferences towards limiting 
imports.  We sequentially estimate extensions of the model to investigate the impact of national 
identity on policy preferences.  We augment the model to test how feelings of nationalism and 
patriotism influence personal trade policy preferences.  The data from the ISSP surveys 
administered in 1995/1996 and 2003/2004 also allow us to reflect the impact of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on trade preferences in the U.S.  We find that individuals do not make decisions based 
solely on the extent to which an action directly increases his/her economic welfare.  Prior to the 
9/11 attacks, nationalism is associated with increased inclinations towards limiting imports while 
patriotism had no statistically significant impact on trade preferences.  The 9/11 attacks 
independently made U.S. survey respondents less open to imports.  Further, the 9/11 attacks 
served to reduce the impact of nationalism on the tendency to limit imports while it enhanced the 
desire to do so through patriotism.   
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I. Introduction 
Misconceptions about the impact of free trade on economic welfare are one of the main 
obstacles to implementing policies allowing for the benefits of comparative advantage based free 
trade.  Much of the literature assumes that individuals are self-interested, and that individuals 
form trade preferences based upon the impact of trade policy on their own personal economic 
welfare.  Previous studies, such as Scheve and Slaughter (2001) indicate that the skill level of an 
individual impacts his/her trade preferences, as suggested by the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (H-
O) model.   
While economists generally assume that people are rational decision makers basing 
policy preferences on economic considerations alone, this may be an unrealistic caricature of 
individual behavior.  Blonigen (2011) suggests that economists revisit their theories in light of 
the fact that demographic factors not related economic theories of self interest help to explain 
trade policy preferences.  Nationalism and patriotism could be strong influences on trade policy 
preferences because they tend to exacerbate the group-think tendencies which are already 
present in voting behavior.  Because voting behavior is largely a function of socio tropic 
perceptions, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) critique previous studies which approached this topic 
exclusively as an issue of self-interested economics instead of looking at it as both an economic 
issue and a political issue.  As nationalism and patriotism increase, individuals become sensitive 
to potential threats to their groups with which they identify and to their country.   
Smith & Kim (2006) apply factor analysis to survey responses to the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) administered in 1995/1996 and 2003/2204 (the identical survey results 
employed in this paper) to identify two socio-political constructs, nationalism and patriotism, 
and demonstrate that national pride rose in the U.S. as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  In 
light of Smith and Kim’s conclusion, we follow the examples of Ehrlich (2010) Ehrlich and 
Maestas (2010), Margalit (2012), and Fordham and Kleinberg (2012) to investigate how trade 
preferences are affected by a variety of factors, both economic and non-economic.  Specifically, 
we sequentially estimate specifications that include economic and established demographic 
factors that the literature suggest explain trade policy preferences and then add measures of 
nationalism and patriotism to the models.   However, a neglected area that interests us is arises 
from the work of Smith and Kim (2006).  Given the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the uncertainty 
shock they introduced, we further investigate how the impact of those attacks may have different 
effects on how nationalism and patriotism impact trade policy preferences.  Thus, we investigate 
how an uncertainty shock feeds back to impact attitudinal factors which in turn affect policy 
preferences. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant 
literature, and discusses how the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model can be extended to predict 
individual’s trade policy preferences by including other demographic characteristics.  Section III 
presents the theoretical framework to support the four specifications to be estimated and Section 
IV describes the data and the methodology for the estimation of the final model that includes the 
most comprehensive set of explanatory variables to explain trade policy preferences. Section V 
highlights the important findings of the study, as well as implications for economists and 
policymakers. Finally, Section VI provides a brief summary of the results and suggest areas for 
further research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Recent studies of the determinants of trade preferences focus on two trade theory models 
to serve as the theoretical foundation for explaining individual trade policy preferences. The 
factor endowment model (H-O) and the specific factors model (Ricardo-Viner) both can be used 
to explain the economic impact of free trade on workers’ incomes. The assumption is that the 
extent to which an individual is positively (adversely) financially impacted by free trade directly 
relates to his/her support of (opposition to) free trade policies.  
Under the Heckscher-Ohlin, (H-O), framework, the factors of production are mobile in 
the long run, and the abundant factor moves to the industry in which it is used relatively 
intensively. According to the H-O model, incomes rise for the factors of production in which a 
country has a relative abundance and are used relatively intensively in the industry whose 
relative prices rise. Because the U.S. has a relative abundance of highly skilled workers, an 
increase in the relative prices of the goods or services whose production use skilled labor 
relatively intensively will result in higher returns to skilled workers (Daniels & von der Ruhr, 
2003). The H-O model predicts that highly skilled individuals benefit from free trade and are 
therefore more likely to support free trade policies. 
Contrary to the H-O model, the Ricardo-Viner (RV) model posits that factor incomes 
vary by sector of employment, not by factor type.  Factors of production, according to this 
theory, are immobile: they are unable to move from one industry of employment to another.  As 
a result, a relative price increase in a comparative advantage sector benefits those factors of 
production which are specific to that sector, and causes the specific factors in sectors 
experiencing relative price declines to realize income losses (Scheve & Slaugher, 2001). 
Workers in comparative disadvantage industries are harmed by free trade and are therefore 
predicted to oppose free trade policies. 
For the sake of brevity, we do not summarize the many studies that find empirical support 
for employing the H-O model as opposed to the R-V model for empirically studying trade policy 
preferences.  We do refer the interested reader to the following studies for additional details 
[Scheve & Slaughter (2001), Daniels & von der Ruhr (2003), Daniels & von der Ruhr (2005), 
Mansfield & Mutz (2009), and O’Rourke & Sinnott (2001)].  Consistent with the literature, we 
therefore employ the H-O model as the basis for the specifications estimated in this paper.  
Consistent with much of the literature, we proxy for skill level with a measure of an individual’s 
educational attainment.   
The literature cited above suggests that trade policy preferences are also influenced by 
demographic, political, and sociological factors in addition to the purely economic factor related 
to its impact on income. O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) argue that, “there are powerful empirical 
reasons for believing that interests alone may not provide a complete explanation for the 
evolution of trade policy; ideas (or ideology) may matter too” (p. 3). There is evidence in 
previous work for the inclusion of age, gender and political affiliation variables in a trade policy 
preferences model [see for example Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003), Mansfield and Mutz 
(2009), Mayda and Rodrik (2001), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), 
and Blonigan (2011)]. The majority of previous studies of international trade policy preferences 
find a statistically significant relationship between gender and protectionist policies. Females, on 
average, favor protectionist policies more often than their male counterparts (Mansfield and 
Mutz (2009), Mayda and Rodrik (2001), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001), and Smith & Kim (2006).  
Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003), Mayda and Rodrik (2001), Mansfield and Mutz 
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(2009), and Smith and Kim (2006) find that older individuals are more likely to favor 
protectionist policies; while, on the other hand, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and O’Rourke and 
Sinnott (2001) find that age is not a significant determinant of trade policy preferences. There is 
a general consensus that an individual’s political affiliation is an explanatory variable in that, 
generally, individuals who identify with the republican (conservative) party are comparatively 
more supportive of free trade policies (Mansfield and Mutz (2009), O’Rourke and Sinnott 
(2001) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001). 
There is some support in the literature for trade union membership as a statistically 
significant determinant of attitudes toward free trade policies.  Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find 
weak support for trade union membership being an indicator of an individual favoring 
protectionist policies. Some studies demonstrate a relationship between race and protectionism, 
such as those by Smith and Kim (2006) and Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005), both of which 
confirm that African Americans, on average, tend to exhibit a preference for a protectionist view 
on trade policies. Although some authors test additional non-economic determinants, the most 
commonly agreed upon “base” variables include: age, gender, race, political party, and trade 
union membership. 
This paper is interested in the interaction of an uncertainty shock (as identitifed as the 
9/11 attacks in Smith and Kim (2006)) and measures of patriotism and nationalism.  One may 
expect both patriotism and nationalism to be positively related to protectionist trade attitudes. 
Nationalism and Patriotism are two interconnected concepts, both of which are explained 
succinctly by Smith and Jarkko (1998) and quoted in Smith and Kim (2006): “Patriotism is love 
of one’s country or dedicated allegiance to same, while nationalism is a strong national devotion 
that places one’s own country above another.”    
Smith and Kim (2006) also conducted research on patriotism and nationalism, and 
extended their analysis to incorporate the relationship between patriotism, nationalism and 
uncertainty shocks.  They find evidence supporting a statistically significant increase in the level  
of patriotism in the USA between the two different survey years separated by the uncertainty  
shocks associated with the  9/11 attacks (1995/96 and 2003/04).  Understandably, a threat to 
national safety and a country’s values causes the citizenry to unify under a common cause; and in 
this sense, Smith  and Kim’s (2006) findings are not surprising. 
The indirect, yet important, secondary implication of the overall rise of national pride in 
the USA post 9/11 is the one that connects the interaction of nationalism (or patriotism) and the 
uncertainty shock to trade preferences.  Smith and Kim (2006) found that nationalism is 
statistically significantly correlated with opposition to multilateralism and internationalism. 
Nationalism contains impacts on peoples’ views that are both larger in magnitude and more 
negative than the impacts of patriotism: Nationalism is significantly negatively correlated with 
globalism, significantly associated with opposition to multilateralism and internationalism, 
strongly and positively correlated with having a demanding sense of citizenship and unfavorable 
attitudes toward immigrants.  The relationship between protectionism and patriotism is not as 
clear (Smith & Kim, 2006).  While both nationalism and patriotism rose in the U.S. following the 
9/11 attacks, how the 9/11 attacks influenced their impact on trade policy preferences is of 
interest in revisiting the notion of addressing how to manage public perceptions of trade. 
Mansfield & Mutz (2009) found that including variables that test for understanding of 
economic theory and beliefs about the welfare impact of trade on the overall economy had a  
small impact on trade attitudes.  When Mansfield & Mutz, (2009) include knowledge of  
economic theory, patriotism and  nationalism variables in the model along with the education  
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proxy, the education variable became statistically insignificant.  
Nationalism may trigger the protectionist attitudes in individuals, which leads people to  
reject new or different goods, services or ideas. In light of the research about patriotism and  
nationalism, voting behavior with respect to trade policy preferences may not be based only on 
an understanding of how a policy will benefit an individual or the country directly, but instead on 
the influence of the nationalistic and patriotic tendencies, which lead to a prima facie support for 
domestic and familiar goods, ideas and companies.  
III. Theoretical Framework and Model 
The dependent variable is a measure of the respondent’s propensity to limit imports in 
order to protect the country’s economy.  Consistent with the findings in most of the studies 
described in the previous section, the H-O model will be applied here as the basis for our 
theoretical approach.  We sequentially estimate four specifications, beginning with the ‘base’ 
model and deliberately add subsets of explanatory variables in order to assess the robustness of 
the results and gain insights regarding the impact of: nationalism and patriotism, the impact of 
9/11 and the interaction of nationalism, patriotism, and the 9/11 shock.  
The first model considered here is composed solely of the traditionally supported, 
economic-determinants of trade policy preferences and the commonly agreed upon ‘base' 
demographic determinants including variables related to the gender, age income, education level, 
political party affiliation, knowledge of NAFTA, the perceived benefits of being a NAFTA 
member, and trade union membership. 
In light of discussion above that policy preferences being influenced by factors beyond 
pure self-interest, this study gives special consideration to the possibility that these factors other 
than pure economic self-interest influence personal trade policy preferences and respond to 
exogenous shocks.  Following an uncertainty shock (in our case, the 9/11 terrorist attacks), 
people feel threatened, often leading them to bind together and display an even greater degree of 
national devotion and desire to protect that nation.  In the event of an uncertainty shock, the 
initial economic shock may interact with feelings of nationalism and patriotism and influence 
trade policy preferences towards increased protectionism.   
One of the unique aspects of this study is that the data are micro-level data gathered from 
the ISSP survey conducted in years 1995 and year 2003. A dummy variable is included to 
capture the effect of the September 11th terrorist attacks.  Following Smith and Kim (2006), the 
uncertainty shock created by the 9/11 terrorist attacks allows for a natural experiment, testing 
trade policy preferences of individuals both before and after 9/11. The economic impact of 9/11 
can, theoretically, interact with patriotism and nationalism, which, when added to the 9/11 
dummy variable and the base model, allows for us to consider how the 9/11 attacks affected the 
manner in which our measures of nationalism and patriotism impact trade policy preferences.  
IV. Data 
This paper relies on the survey data from the 1995 and 2003 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP) module on national identity.  Hence, the data used in this study are pooled data 
from two different cross sections: one sample includes the respondents from the 1995/96 
national identity survey and the other includes respondents from the 2003/04 national identity 
survey. The survey focuses on individual attitudes about global issues and on respondents’ 
attitudes toward issues of national identity and international relations.  As such, it includes many 
socio-demographic and socio-economic variables. 
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Description of the Dependent Variable 
This study’s central question is to ask whether individuals support the limitation of 
foreign imports for the purpose of protecting the U.S. national economy. The survey question 
is phrased as follows: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
(Respondent’s Country) should limit the imports of foreign products in order to protect its 
national economy?”  The responses are coded as: Response 1 = Agree Strongly; Response 2 = 
Agree; Response 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; Response 4 = Disagree; Response 5 = 
Disagree Strongly. 
This question assumes that the respondent has an understanding of how the national 
economy would be impacted by free trade. In order to control for an individual’s knowledge of 
economic theory, a variable is included which captures individuals’ understanding of the 
economic benefits of NAFTA for the United States.  The dependent variable contains some 
missing observations, and some respondents who refused to answer the question, or didn’t know 
how they felt about the issue.  This subset of responses was recorded as missing observations. 
Because the dependent variable is bounded with a lower bound of 1 and an upper value of 
5, Ordered Probit (OP) is the econometric technique that will be used to estimate the 
specifications. 
 
Description of the Independent Variables 
This study contains eleven independent variables to create a model of the different 
determinants of trade preferences. AGE is a continuous variable. The coefficient associated with 
AGE is expected to be negative, as the literature suggests that respondents from an older 
generation will, on average, exhibit greater protectionist tendencies, all else constant.  
EDUCATION is a continuous variable measured in the number of years past elementary 
school for which he/she received credit.  Education is a proxy for skill, therefore the higher the 
level of education, the more the respondent should support free trade, meaning that the sign of 
the coefficient should be positive 
FEMALE is a dummy variable, coded ‘0’ for male and ‘1’ for female. Its coefficient is 
expected to be negative as females are believed to support protectionism more than their male 
counterparts.  
‘Know_NAFTA’ is a measure of how much knowledge the respondent has of NAFTA.   
It is coded such that a ‘1’ means that the respondent has heard or read a lot about NAFTA, and a 
‘4’ means that he/she has heard or read nothing at all about it. Knowledge of trade can either increase 
or decrease support for free trade, so there are no a priori expectations for the coefficient of this 
variable. ‘NAFTA_Benefits’ is a follow up question to the ‘Know_NAFTA’ question, asking how 
much the respondent benefits from being a member. It takes the form of a dummy variable 
where ‘0’ is coded as does benefit and ‘1’ is coded as does not benefit. Respondents who 
claimed they had never heard of or did not know of any potential benefits of NAFTA were coded 
as missing values. Respondents who think that they do not benefit from the NAFTA membership 
will be more likely to oppose free trade, so the sign on that variable should be negative. 
UNION is also a dummy variable, coded so that ‘1’ indicates that the respondent or his/her 
spouse is a member of a trade union. A ‘0’ means that neither the respondent nor his/her spouse is a 
member of trade union. Trade unions are associated with being in lower blue-collar jobs; therefore, 
union membership indicates that the respondent is part of an import disadvantage industry, meaning 
the sign on ‘Union’ should be negative. 
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POLITICAL is the (American) political party with which the respondent identifies.  A 
strong republican is coded as ‘7’ and a strong democrat is coded as a ‘1’.  Any respondent who 
did not list a preference or listed other was omitted from the variable data. Respondents 
indicating that he/she identifies with an “other party” were coded as a 4, which is an 
“independent” party.  Because republicans are expected to support free trade, the sign associated 
with this variable should be positive. 
RACE is a binary dummy variable that takes on a value of ‘1’ if the respondent identifies 
his/her ethnic background as African, black, or Caribbean (non-hispanic) and ‘0’ for all other 
values. Smith & Kim (2006) contend that minorities have a tendency to support protectionist 
policies; therefore, the expected sign for RACE is negative. 
SHOCK is the time dummy variable, which takes on a value of 1 if the respondent was 
from the 2003 survey and 0 for all other values. Protectionism is purported to increase after the 
September 11
th
 attacks, so the sign on the dummy variable should be negative.  
Patriotism and Nationalism represent two channels through which motives other than 
issues of self-interest may impact trade policy preferences.  Further, they are the two variables 
which may interact with an uncertainty shock such as the 9/11 attacks in affecting international 
trade policy preferences travel.  It is thought that there is a positive relationship between 
nationalism and restrictive trade policies because nationalism picks up public anti-
internationalism, low out-group tolerance, and perceptions of superiority.  
Both the measures of nationalism and patriotism are normalized variables with a mean 
of zero whose signs are expected to be positive, as lower values of the variables reflect 
heightened levels of nationalism and patriotism (more information on the construction of both 
the nationalism and patriotism variables follows this subsection).  Thus, as these variables rise 
in value, they reflect lower levels of nationalism and patriotism.  The relationship between 
patriotism and the propensity to favor limiting imports is ambiguous and therefore there are no 
a priori expectations for the coefficient’s sign.  
 
Measuring Patriotism and Nationalism via Factor Analysis 
Variables such as patriotism and nationalism are often difficult to measure directly 
because they are latent variables, which are either too complicated to capture with one survey 
question or contain complexities which make it very difficult to accurately measure with straight 
forward questionnaires. Fortunately, factor analysis, a dimension reduction technique that is 
especially useful for survey data and other data that are qualitative by nature provides a powerful 
tool commonly used for the purpose of identifying underlying constructs of a group of strongly 
correlated variables.  
The literature surrounding patriotism and nationalism is extensive, and there is a large 
amount of ambiguity about what factors or concepts are captured by the terms “patriotism” and 
“nationalism” (Huddy & Khatib, 2007).  Fortunately, the ISSP survey data groups questions by 
common underlying themes, or ‘constructs’ in order to facilitate the measurement of variables 
that are difficult to quantify, such as patriotism and nationalism.  Smith & Kim (2006) provide 
excellent guidance in the way of using factor analysis to create normalized variables from a 
group of survey questions. This study follows their work closely and refers the interested reader 
to their work for details regarding the process.  Appendix 1 lists the questions used in the factor 
analysis to construct the measures of nationalism and patriotism. 
Again, the variables are constructed such that the lower the patriotism and nationalism 
scores, the greater the extent to which the respondent holds those views. A negative score would 
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indicate that the respondent agrees strongly with patriotic or nationalistic sentiments and 
statements. In 1995, the mean patriotism and nationalism scores are 0.1272 and 0.0377, 
respectively. The mean scores of both of these variables for 2003, are -0.1430 and -0.0424, 
respectively.  The changes are statistically significant and much like Smith & Kim (2006) 
concluded, reflect an attitudinal shift to increased patriotism and nationalism between the years 
1995 and 2003.  
V. Results 
Base Model 
The results of the model confirm the findings of the previous studies that observed the 
accuracy of the H-O model in predicting who would benefit from trade. The results of the Base 
Model are provided in Table 1. Consistent with the predictions of the H-O model, education is a 
strong predictor of attitudes toward free trade: individuals with higher levels of educational 
attainment have a statistically significantly greater likelihood of opposing policies limiting imports 
to the U.S. Highly skilled individuals tend to favor free trade because it benefits them, as there is 
an abundance of skilled labor in the United States. 
Although education is highly significant and positively related to the dependent variable, 
Know_NAFTA and Nafta_Benefits are both statistically significant, which indicates that even 
once an individuals’ knowledge of the economic benefits of free trade are controlled for, education 
is still a significant determinant of trade policy preferences. An important finding in this base 
model, which is not evident in the majority of the trade policy literature, is the impact that an 
understanding of economic trade theory has on trade preferences. The variables ‘Know_NAFTA’ 
and ‘Nafta_Benefits’ are included in the model to control for an individual’s understanding of 
economic theory.  Both suggest that as an individual knows of NAFTA and understands its 
benefits, that individual is more supportive of trade. That ‘Nafta_Benefits’ is statistically 
significant is evidence that individuals’ trade policy preferences are indeed influenced by his or 
her perception of how the policy will impact the country as a whole.  Consistent with the literature 
on voting behavior, individuals do indeed form opinions on the basis of how a policy will impact 
the country overall, not simply on the basis of his/her individual economic welfare (Mansfield & 
Mutz, 2009).  
EDUCATION is statistically significant; thus, its influence on trade policy preferences can 
stem from either its welfare-enhancing effect for highly skilled workers (as suggested by the H-O 
model) or from its ability to impart on its recipients a greater tolerance for new or different people 
and ideas (as supported by Mansfield & Mutz, 2009).  
The conclusion to which the former interpretation of EDUCATION’s and 
‘Know_NAFTA’s’ statistical significance leads is that individuals’ trade policy preferences are a 
function of the perceived impact of the policy on his/her household economic welfare and the 
impact of the policy on the entire country’s economic welfare. While ‘Know_NAFTA’ controls 
for the influence that an understanding of how a trade policy will affect the economic welfare of 
the overall country, EDUCATION may capture the influence that an individual’s perception of 
how a particular trade policy will enhance (harm) his or her personal (or household) economic 
welfare. Therefore, trade policy preferences are a function of an individual’s perception of the 
policy’s benefit to his/her household or personal welfare and an individual’s perception of how the 
policy will enhance (harm) the overall country’s economic welfare. 
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As discussed earlier the RACE, GENDER, AGE, UNION, POLITICAL and Knowledge 
of NAFTA variables are included in order to control for the demographic factors in trade 
preference formation that play a role in trade preference formation. With the exception of 
POLITICAL (statistically insignificant), all of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected 
signs, and are statistically significant. Union membership, race, and age are three non-economic 
factors for which consensus do not exist for the direction of expected influence on trade policy 
preference. As suggested by Daniels & von der Ruhr (2003), individuals who are currently 
members of a Union (or who have previously been members or have a member of his/her 
household who is a union member) are significantly more likely to prefer restrictive trade policy 
preferences. The results of the Base Model suggest that if an individual identifies with an African 
ethnic group, he/she has a tendency to oppose free trade. Older individuals exhibit a higher 
marginal propensity to limit imports than the younger cohort (ceteris paribus). 
Having now analyzed the results of the Base model, the following portion of the 
results section discusses the findings of non-economic trade determinants; namely, patriotism, 
nationalism and the interaction terms. 
The non-economic determinants of trade policy preferences are evaluated and analyzed 
in the following sequence: Model 2 is the Base Model plus patriotism and nationalism; Model 3 
adds a dummy variable for 9/11, which takes on a value of ‘1’ if the observation was surveyed 
after September 11, 2001 and ‘0’ for all other values, to Model 2; Model 4 adds an interaction 
term between the 9/11 shock dummy with Nationalism and the 9/11 shock dummy with 
Patriotism.  All of the results for the Base Model and Model 2 through Model 4 are displayed in 
Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Adding patriotism and nationalism to the base model (creating Model 2) introduces a 
few interesting changes in the magnitudes of the existing variables’ estimated coefficients. 
Consistent with Smith & Kim (2006), this study’s results indicate that a greater degree of 
nationalism present in an individual’s attitudes is a good predictor of restrictive trade policy 
preferences. The estimated coefficient of Nationalism is highly significant (1-percent level) 
and it has the expected (positive) sign, meaning that individuals with lower levels of 
nationalism have a lower marginal propensity to limit imports. The coefficient for Patriotism is 
not statistically significant.  
A second note-worthy finding in Model 2 is the change in the magnitude of the 
coefficient of Political. When Patriotism and Nationalism are absent (as in the Base Model), 
Political does not have a statistically significant estimated coefficient; however, when the two 
constructed variables are included in Model 2, the coefficient for political party becomes 
significant at a 1-percent level and it exhibits the expected sign. A final noteable difference 
between the two models is the insignificance of AGE’s estimated coefficient in Model 2. A 
potential explanation for this change in the coefficient’s magnitude is that the nationalism 
variable is capturing some of its influence.   
Model 3 adds the 9/11 shock and shows that the shock made respondents less open to 
trade, as expected.    Model 4 adds the interaction terms between NATIONALISM and the 
SHOCK dummy variable as well as between PATRIOTISM and the SHOCK dummy variable.  
The coefficient of the former is negative and statistically significant at a 10-percent level of 
significance (one tail).  The interaction term between PATRIOTISM and SHOCK dummy 
variable is positive and statistically significant the 5-percent level of significance (one tail).  We 
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note that all of the coefficients on the other independent variables remain fairly consistent across 
Model 2 through Model 4. 
The purpose of the interaction terms is to investigate the influence of 9/11 through 
nationalism and patriotism with respect to changes in protectionism, holding all else constant. 
The sign of the interaction term’s coefficient with nationalism is negative and significant.  This 
result suggests that the impact of 9/11 through feelings of nationalism actually ran counter to the 
impact of nationalism itself on restricting trade.  Thus, the 9/11 attacks led to less of an 
influence for restricting trade by way of nationalist feelings.  It is also interesting to note that an 
F-test of the statistical significance of the sum of the coefficients of the nationalism variable and 
the interaction of nationalism and the shock variable found the sum to be statistically 
insignificant.   
On the other hand, the results show the interaction term between PATRIOTISM and 9/11 
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This suggests that 
following the 9/11 attacks, decreased (increased) levels of patriotism were associated with 
attitudes more (less) open to free trade through patriotism despite the fact that the measure of 
patriotism itself is never statistically significant on its own.  The F-test on the statistical 
significance of the sum of the coefficients of the patriotism variable and the interaction of 
patriotism and the shock variable found the sum to be statistically significant. 
 The differential impact of how 9/11 interacted with feelings of nationalism and patriotism 
in attitudes towards restricting trade are interesting and offer motivation for further study.     
VI. Conclusion 
The trade literature on the determinants of individual trade policy preferences have 
largely been focusing on the economic determinants of trade preferences while overlooking the 
important non-economic determinants of trade preferences. New literature on the topic of trade 
preferences in the political science field has begun to question the economic assumption that 
individuals make rational choices based on how an action or policy will impact his or her 
economic self-interests. Considering the non-economic determinants of trade preferences gives 
credence to the idea that there are other factors which impact trade preferences irrespective of 
the economic impact on one’s own welfare.  
This study provides a unique natural experiment to research the topic of uncertainty 
shocks and the impact on trade policy preferences through its own influence as well as its 
influence on measures of nationalism and patriotism. By collecting individual survey data both 
before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a deeper investigation of the channels 
through which uncertainty shocks and feelings of nationalism and patriotism impact trade 
preferences was possible.  One of the most important findings is that uncertainty shocks 
exacerbate protectionist tendencies through patriotism and reduced them through nationalism. 
Given that nationalism and patriotism plays an important role in the formation of trade policy 
preferences, a good direction for future research is better understand how such an uncertainty 
shock may interact with such attitudes in the formation of policy preferences and the different 
ways in which policy makers can reduce the negative attitudes towards trade openness.  
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Table 1 Ordered Probit Estimation Results 
  
Base Model Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
AGE -0.0046** -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0019 
  (-1.9369) (-1.0232) (-0.7963) (-0.7755) 
EDUCATION 0.0829*** 0.0559*** 0.0585*** 0.0600*** 
  (-5.6499) (3.7033) (3.8605) (3.9564) 
FEMALE -0.2013*** -0.2567*** -0.2604*** -0.2657*** 
  (-2.6594) (-3.3463) (-3.3914) (-3.4568) 
KNOW_NAFTA -0.1670^^^ -0.1507^^^ -0.1348^^^ -0.1357^^^ 
  (-3.4791) (-3.0988) (-2.7457) (-2.7629) 
NAFTA_BENEFITS -0.5937*** -0.5906*** -0.6617*** -0.6491*** 
  (-6.7081) (-6.4714) (-6.9115) (-6.7685) 
UNION -0.3375*** -0.3074*** -0.3421*** -0.3405*** 
  (-3.0250) (-2.7211) (-3.0043) (-2.9744) 
POLITICAL 0.0127 0.0518*** 0.0509*** 0.0510*** 
  (0.6964) (2.7081) (2.6566) (2.6477) 
RACE -0.4202*** -0.3573*** -0.3174** -0.3225** 
  (-2.9508) (-2.4841) (-2.1962) (-2.2272) 
PATRIOTISM   -0.006 -0.0143 -0.1007 
    (-0.1483) (-0.3533) (-1.6371) 
NATIONALISM   0.3436*** 0.3356*** 0.4167*** 
    (8.5381) (8.3068) (6.6379) 
SHOCK     -0.2069*** -0.1752** 
      (-2.4951) (-2.0794) 
SHOCK*NATIONALISM       -0.1248* 
        (-1.6206) 
SHOCK*PATRIOTISM       0.1437** 
        1.8116 
N=854 
        
Pseudo-R-squared 0.059 0.090 0.093 0.095 
z-statistic in parenthesis 
*significant at 10% (one tail) 
**significant at 5% (one tail) 
*** significant at 1% (one tail) 
^significant at 10% (one tail) 
^^significant at 5% (one tail) 
^^^ significant at 1% (one tail) 
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Appendix 1: Question Wordings for Factor Analysis Nationalism 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Strongly agree; 
 Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree. 
 
1. I would rather be a citizen of COUNTRY than of any other country in the world. 
2. There are some things about COUNTRY today that make me feel ashamed of 
 COUNTRY. 
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like 
 COUNTRY NATIONALITY. 
4. Generally speaking, COUNTRY is a better country than most other countries. 
5. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. 
6. COUNTRY should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other 
 nations.*1 
7. When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be a citizen 
 of (R’s Country).* 
Appendix 1 (continued) Patriotism: 
How proud of you of COUNTRY in each of the following? Very proud; Somewhat 
 proud; Not very proud; Not proud at all. 
1. The way democracy works. 
2. Its political influence in the world. 
3. COUNTRY’s economic achievements.  
4. Its social security system. 
5. Its scientific and technological advancements. 
6. Its achievements in sports. 
7. Its achievements in the arts and literature. 
8. COUNTRY’s armed forces. 
9. Its history. 
10. Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. 
 
 
 
 
1 * Indicates that the question was included at the authors’ discretion 
 
